06 Oct 2026
Homecoming Austal’s profit play

UPDATE: This interview and story first appeared in the October 5 edition of Business News magazine. An update to the due diligence process has been announced by Austal since then and can be found here.
Paddy Gregg doesn’t sound like a man panicking about carving off the largest piece of his company.
For more than two decades, Austal’s shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, has been the group’s undisputed centre of gravity.
It generated the lion’s share of group revenue, minted US naval credibility, and built the aluminium trimarans that turned a local Western Australian ferry builder into a genuine American defence prime.
Now, with two private suitors submitting offers for Mobile up to $US1.35 billion ($2.05 billion), Austal’s chief executive is openly laying the groundwork for life without it.
“Years ago, five years ago, the US business absolutely dominated the group in terms of its size, revenue, and the profit it was generating,” Mr Gregg told Business News.
“Today, Australia could be as big or bigger. Whereas in the past, divesting the US may have left Australasia sub-scale. Today it absolutely could stand on its own two feet and remain listed.”
The numbers explain both why suitors want the Alabama yard and why the Austal board is willing to listen.
Last month, Austal reported a $202.8 million loss on earnings before interest and taxes inside its US division for FY26, dragging the consolidated group into the red.
The culprit was an ugly clutch of legacy surface-ship programs: the towing and salvage ships, an auxiliary floating dry dock, and landing craft utility vessels.
Austal had bid for those steel programs expecting to act as a secondary ‘follow yard’.
Instead, design headaches and shipyard shuffles left Mobile operating as the lead yard, debugging unfinished designs while eating post-pandemic wage and material inflation under unforgiving, fixed-price contracts.
“We were finding all the problems, we were fixing them, and that was never intended in the prices we submitted,” Mr Gregg said.
“If you have one of these, you can deal with it. But a lot of these contracts were bid at the same time and are suffering from the same features.”
Austal is actively chasing requests for equitable adjustment with the US Navy to claw back cash, but Mr Gregg acknowledged recovering money from the Pentagon is a grinding, legalistic crawl.
Yet just across the Mobile waterfront, the dynamic is reversed.
Austal’s newly built submarine module facility is booming: fabricating structural assemblies for US Virginia- and Columbiaclass nuclear submarines under subcontract to General Dynamics Electric Boat.
Because it operates as a buildto-print subcontract on a mature design, it has avoided the fixedprice margin bleeding of the surface programs.
Austal currently has 500 workers dedicated to submarine modules in Alabama.
Mr Gregg expects that headcount to hit 1,000 by December.
That prime nuclear waterfront footprint is precisely what has triggered the takeover brawl.
South Korea’s Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Aerospace – already sitting on a 19.9 per cent stake in parent company Austal – kicked off the contest in August with an indicative cash bid between $US1.05 billion and $US1.20 billion for the US business.
Then, in September, a US syndicate led by Florida investment firm Wildcat Infrastructure gatecrashed the discussions, proposing a competing offer between $US1.25 billion and $US1.35 billion.
Both offers are all-cash indicative proposals, structured on a cash-free, debt-free basis.
Both are currently working through four weeks of due diligence.
Wildcat’s obvious pitch is that, as an American outfit, it offers a frictionless run through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and the Defence Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA).
Mr Gregg dismissed the suggestion that foreign allied capital like Hanwha faced an unsurmountable barrier in Washington.
“We are a foreign owner of a US entity today,” Mr Gregg said, noting Austal USA’s long-standing Special Security Agreement, which walls off classified US Navy IP from Australian board oversight.
“Hanwha already have a security agreement in place to own their Philadelphia shipyard.
“None of these things are impossible; they’re just processes and procedures that have to be worked through.”
If the board does sign a binding deal near Wildcat’s top range, Austal Limited will find itself sitting on a $2 billion pile of cash.
But getting that capital into the hands of local shareholders is far from straightforward.
Austal has paid minimal Australian corporate tax in recent years due to US loss offsets and heavy capital expenditure, leaving its franking account largely bare.
“We don’t have a lot of franking credits, so doing something that was tax-inefficient for shareholders would probably not be welcomed,” Mr Gregg said.
Rather than emptying the proceeds into an unfranked special dividend, the board is considering retaining cash to build out WA operations and pursue regional defence acquisitions.
“Having a big chunk of cash at a time when there’s significant growth gives the board a lot of options,” Mr Gregg said.
“It’s a really nice problem to have.”
That domestic growth is no longer hypothetical.
Under the binding Strategic Shipbuilding Agreement (SSA) signed with Canberra last year, Austal has been anointed as the Commonwealth’s sovereign continuous naval shipbuilder at Henderson.
The baseline workload is massive: 18 landing craft medium (LCM) vessels and eight landing craft heavy (LCH) ships.
Together with ongoing patrol boat builds, it gives the Henderson yard an unshakeable $5 billion foundational pipeline.
Beyond the landing craft sits an even bigger prize: the Commonwealth’s 11-ship general purpose frigate program.
Under that plan, Canberra opted to build the first three frigates offshore in Japan before transferring construction of the remaining eight vessels to Henderson.
Crucially, Mr Gregg said a staggered structure protected Austal from repeating its Alabama nightmare.
Rather than crashing into WA’s tight labour market – where shipbuilders trade punches with iron ore and LNG operators paying mining wages – he said the overseas lead-time gave Henderson breathing room to ramp up before taking on the complex frigates.
“Normally I’d be the first person jumping up and down if the government said we’re building three ships offshore,” Mr Gregg said.
“But looking at what we’re doing, it makes a whole lot of sense. It was based on real commonsense conversations with the Commonwealth around sensible ramp ups.
“Fast forward to signing a contract on a general-purpose frigate in a couple of years. You know, that’s the best part of a 20-year look ahead.
Austal has already hired hundreds of engineers, planners, and procurement officers in Perth ahead of cutting steel on the landing craft later this year, with a blue-collar recruitment wave set to follow.
Mr Gregg insists that if both American bids collapse during diligence, Austal will happily keep Mobile and trade its way through the contract fixes.
But his tone makes clear that Henderson no longer requires Alabama to justify its market listing.
Selling the American yard would strip Austal of its global megacap ambitions.
In exchange, it would purge hundreds of millions of dollars in fixedprice contractual risk, eliminate foreign regulatory head-butting, and leave Mr Gregg running a well-capitalised, high-margin sovereign monopoly in his own backyard.
For a company that spent 20 years trying to conquer the Pentagon, coming home might just be the most profitable move on the board.
Share Price
Revenue
| 4th | - | Perenti | $3.35b |
| 5th | - | Monadelphous | $2.80b |
| 6th | - | Macmahon Holdings | $2.62b |
| 7th | - | Austal | $2.05b |