THE first article in this two-part series (Business News, March 28) established the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its role in Ukraine’s war with Russia.
NATO has provided Ukraine assistance where possible, assuming it did not represent an escalation of the conflict. Without an obligation to do so, NATO did not close the air space or provide direct military assistance, citing fear of escalation. Moral reasoning, potential for future NATO membership, and war crimes have not motivated military action in assistance of Ukraine.
As predicted, this has damaged the relevance of NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking to NATO on March 24, was clear that he did not blame NATO but the inference in his words regarding the impact of the organisation’s inaction was powerful.
His most relevant statement from an Australian perspective was the comment that “Ukrainians never thought that the alliance and the allies were different”.
Australia is fortunate to have allies with powerful military capabilities, among them NATO nations, as well as AUKUS and the Quad partners.
To draw upon Ukraine’s experience, however, is there a distinction between allies and a formal alliance that compels action?
If Australia was under attack, would fear of escalation leave our powerful allies watching from the sidelines, offering equipment but no direct engagement?
Australia’s greatest defence may be diplomatic in nature, seeking to turn allies into alliances, with diplomatic agreements that require our allies to act. Naturally, this arrangement must be reciprocal, committing Australia to defend our allies.
Leaked documents in recent days indicate that China and the Solomon Islands are drafting an agreement under which a Chinese military base could be established within 2,000 kilometres of Australia. Chinese naval vessels in Honiara would be closer to Sydney than Australian vessels located in Perth.
Here is where the diplomatic challenges and urgency lies. Australia must embark on an urgent and robust diplomatic mission to turn allies into alliances, to convert our influence with AUKUS, the Quad, and others to establish a body like NATO for our region, with its own Article 5 condition that declares an attack on one is an attack on all.
There has been some history in this regard. A Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established in 1955 but was dissolved in 1977 through lack of interest. Similarly, a Northeast Asia Treaty Organisation (NEATO) was proposed but failed to move past the proposal phase because of historical tensions between South Korea and Japan, and over the implications for Japan’s view on defence.
The Ukrainian experience and the Solomon Islands draft agreement indicate the time has come to solidify allied relationships, to build and improve regional diplomatic relations, and to compel each nation to work together in the face of security threats.
This is not to suggest those efforts have not been occurring, but the war in Ukraine has shown that only an Article 5 type clause will trigger supportive military action.
This will likely lead to increases in defence, diplomatic and foreign aid budget figures, which have not yet been released at the time of writing.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison recently announced a $38 billion plan to expand Australian Defence Force recruitment by 20,000 personnel. He also announced the $4.3 billion plan to construct a Large Vessel Dry Berth (LVDB) in Western Australia, a significant item of news for WA industry and for defence.
While the announcement is currently short on detail, my column, ‘Large vessel berth opportunity’, (Business News May 31 2021) provided information regarding that project.
Mr Morrison has also announced key manufacturing areas that need to be established or boosted in Australia to guard against supply chain risk, including semiconductors, where the predominance of world supply comes from Taiwan, and personal protective equipment, where Australia has been reliant on Chinese supply.
We must not take our national security for granted and bearing witness to the lack of direct military support in Ukraine is a lesson we cannot ignore. Funding must support diplomatic efforts that make reciprocal and mutual defence an obligation.
• Kristian Constantinides is the general manager of Airflite, and chairperson of AIDN-WA; the opinions expressed are purely his own
